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CONTROLLING THE CAT'S PAW: CIRCUIT SPLIT
CONCERNING THE LEVEL OF CONTROL A
BIASED SUBORDINATE MUST EXERT OVER
THE FORMAL DECISIONMAKER'S CHOICE TO
TERMINATE
Taran S. Kaler*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent survey, fifteen percent of American workers
perceived that they had been the subject of employment
discrimination or bias at their workplace.1 In 2005, the
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC)2  received approximately 75,000 claims from
employees alleging employment discrimination.3
To combat discrimination, beginning in the mid-1900s,
Comments Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 48; J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law, 2008; B.A. Political Economy of Industrial
Societies and South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of California,
Berkeley, 2005. In December 2006, I began the process of researching and
writing about this topic. I wish to thank all the sets of eyes that have edited
and reviewed the comment since that time.
1. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, New Gallup Poll on
Employment Discrimination Shows Progress, Problems 40 Years After
Founding of EEOC (Dec. 8, 2005), http://www.eeoc.gov/press/12-8-05.html
(showing that when broken down into sub-groups, the survey indicated that
31% of Asian-Americans reported incidents of discrimination, making them the
largest percentage of any ethnic group, while 26% African-Americans reported
discrimination, making them the second largest ethnic group).
2. Filing a Charge of Employment Discrimination (Dec. 20, 2007),
http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/overview-charge-filing.html ("A charge must be
filed with EEOC within 180 days from the date of the alleged violation, in order
to protect the charging party's rights . . . This 180-day filing deadline is
extended to 300 days if the charge also is covered by a state or local anti-
discrimination law.").
3. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Information and
Planning, Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2005 (Jan. 27, 2006),
http://eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (showing that 75,000 charge claims arose
from discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, religion, retaliation, age,
disability, and equal pay).
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the United States Congress passed employment
antidiscrimination legislation, such as Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act,4 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,5 and
the Americans with Disabilities Act.6  Such legislation
attempts to provide equal employment opportunities in the
workplace, deter discrimination, and provide remedies to
victims of discrimination.7  An aspect of employment
antidiscrimination legislation is to prohibit an employer from
discriminating because of a person's protected class in areas
such as employment, termination, promotion, compensation,
or any other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.8
One manner in which courts have recognized
discrimination claims is under the subordinate bias liability
theory, also known as the cat's paw theory.9 Under this
theory, a court will impute the discriminatory bias of a
subordinate, who lacks the formal authority to terminate an
employee, to the decisionmaker who does have formal
authority to terminate. 10 In such instances, even though the
formal decisionmaker does not exhibit bias toward the
terminated employee, courts can still hold the employer
vicariously liable."
Though the various United States Courts of Appeal agree
that an employee may bring a discriminatory claim under
this theory, the circuit courts are split as to the level of
control a biased subordinate must exert over the formal
decisionmaker." In order to fully understand the circuit split
and the need for a uniform standard, one must understand
the diverging levels of control that the different circuit courts
currently apply.
Part II of this comment begins with a brief discussion
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e - 2000e-17 (2000).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1986).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
7. See Tammi J. Lees, Comment, The Individual vs. the Employer: Who
Should be Held Liable Under Employment Discrimination Law? 54 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 861, 882 (2004) ("[Rletribution, rather than financial gain, may be
the motivating factor for bringing an employment discrimination lawsuit.").
8. Id.
9. Shager v. Upjohn, 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990).
10. Id. This comment discusses the cat's paw theory in terms of
termination. However, the theory applies to other cognizable adverse
employment actions as well.
11. Id. at406.
12. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d
476, 486 (10th Cir. 2006).
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regarding antidiscrimination legislation and the agency
principles that support them. 3 It describes subordinate bias
liability in detail and discusses how courts utilize the theory
to hold employers vicariously liable for the intentional torts of
their subordinates.14 Part II concludes by discussing the
different circuit courts' standards and provide synopsis of
relevant case law.15
Part III of this comment identifies the problems that
arise from the current circuit split.16 Part IV analyzes why
the Fourth and Fifth Circuits' interpretations do not
adequately extend the agency principles of the employment
antidiscrimination legislation and neglect to balance the
competing interests of employees and employers. 7 Finally,
Part V proposes that all circuits adopt the standard of
causation utilized by the Tenth Circuit, and at the same time,
consider and account for the distinctions between coworker
bias and supervisor bias. 8  Such a uniform standard will
balance the concerns and interests of both employers and
employees.19
II. BACKGROUND
A. Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA
President Lyndon B. Johnson signed into law the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 on July 2, 1964.20 An important aspect of
the law is Title VII, which provides that "[it] shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin."21 The United States Congress
intended that such legislation would deter discriminatory
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See infra Part II.C.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt. Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 304 (4th
Cir. 2004) (Michael, J., dissenting).
20. Pre 1965: Events Leading to the Creation of EEOC,
httpJ/www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/pre1965/index.html (last visited April 7,
2008).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
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behavior by employers as well as provide remedies to affected
employees. 22 Three years later, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) added an additional
protected class-age.23  The ADEA prohibits employment
discrimination against persons over forty years of age.24
On July 26, 1990, President George H. W. Bush signed
into law the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).25
Title I of the ADA focuses on employment, making it unlawful
for an employer to discriminate against a "qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual."26 Like Title VII and the ADEA, the ADA provides
legal recourse to groups of individuals who have been
"subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment and
relegated to a position of political powerlessness in
[American] society, based on characteristics that are beyond
the control of such individuals."27
Congress directed federal courts to interpret the
antidiscrimination employment legislation based on
principles of agency law. 28  Agency principles are evident
because the acts similarly define "employer" as a "person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce... and any agent
of such a person."29 In Burlington Industry, Inc., v. Ellerth,3 °
the Supreme Court dealt with agency principles regarding
Title VII. The issue was whether courts could hold an
employer vicariously liable in an action taken by one of its
subordinates who had created a hostile work environment.32
The Court explained that "it is less likely that a willful tort
will properly be held to be in the course of employment and
that the liability of the master for such torts will naturally be
more limited."33 A biased subordinate usually discriminates
22. See Lees, supra note 7, at 882.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 621.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a).
25. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA): 1990 - 2002,
http://www.eeoc.gov/ada/ (last visited April 7, 2008).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
28. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); 28 U.S.C. § 630(b); see also Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("[Tlhe meaning of a statute must, in the first
instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed.").
30. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742.
31. Id. at 754-65.
32. Id. at 751.
33. Id. at 756 (citing FLOYD R. MECHEM, OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF AGENCY
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for personal reasons that are wholly unrelated and adverse to
the goals and objectives of an employer. 4 The discrimination
does not serve business interests nor is the discrimination
likely in the course and scope of the subordinate's
employment.3 1
However, in limited circumstances, the Court in Ellerth
recognized that an employer may be held liable for its
subordinate's intentional torts outside the scope of
employment under agency principles.3 6  The Court cited
Section 219 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which
states:
[a] master is not subject to liability for the torts
of his servants acting outside the scope of their
employment, unless.., the servant purported to
act or to speak on behalf of the principal and
there was reliance upon apparent authority, or
he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the
existence of the agency relation. 7
Thus, a court may find the employer vicariously liable
for the discriminatory behavior of a subordinate employee if
the terminated employee can establish that the subordinate
acted as an agent of the employer.38
B. Subordinate Bias Liability-Cat's Paw Theory
Courts have recognized claims of employment
discrimination based on the discrimination exhibited by the
employer's subordinates.3 9  Usually, "the person with
authority over the employment decision is the one who
executes the [termination] against the employee. '40 However,
266 (4th ed. 1952)).
34. See id. at 757.
35. See id.
36. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758 (1998).
37. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958)).
38. See Ali Razzaghi, Comment, Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics
Management, Inc.: "Substantially Influencing" the Fourth Circuit to Change its
Standard for Imputing Employer Liability for the Biases of a Non-
Decisionmaker, 73 U. CIN. L. Rev. 1709, 1714 (2005).
39. See Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005); Stimpson
v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999); Ercegovich v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 354-55 (6th Cir. 1998); Long v.
Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1996); Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 50
F.3d 1204, 1213-14 (3rd Cir. 1995); Stacks v. S.W. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27
F.3d 1316, 1323 (8th Cir. 1994).
40. Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 226 (5th Cir. 2000).
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in certain situations, if the terminated employee can establish
that another subordinate had influence over the formal
decisionmaker, courts have imputed the subordinate's
discriminatory animus to the formal decisionmaker. 41 Thus,
even though the formal decisionmaker did not harbor
discriminatory bias toward the adversely affected employee,
courts will attribute the discriminating intent of the
subordinate to the employer.42
Termed the cat's paw43 theory, the principle refers to a
"situation in which a biased subordinate, who lacks
decisionmaking power, uses the formal decision maker as a
dupe in a deliberate scheme to trigger a discriminatory
employment action."44  In other words, an employer is
vicariously liable if the formal decisionmaker who terminated
the employee simply rubber stamped the biased subordinate's
discriminatory intent.45 The subordinate who exhibits bias
toward the employee is the one who essentially fires that
employee, regardless of whether he had the official title, rank,
or authority to do so.46
Under the theory, the biased subordinate "accomplishes
his discriminatory goals by misusing the authority granted to
him by the employer-for example, the authority to monitor
performance, report disciplinary infractions, and recommend
employment actions I as pretext for discrimination.48  The
biased subordinate may discerningly use such reports to
fabricate or exaggerate information that would be
detrimental to an adverse employment decision.49  The
reports then can serve as a catalyst for the subordinate's bias
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d at 484 (stating that the name derives itself
"from a fable . . . in which a monkey convinces an unwitting cat to pull
chestnuts from a hot fire. As the cat scoops the chestnuts from the fire ...
burning his paw in the process, the monkey eagerly gobbles them up, leaving
none for the cat."
44. Id. (quoting Llampallas v. Mini Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1249
(11th Cir. 1998)).
45. Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir.
2000).
46. See Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1996).
47. BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d at 485.
48. Black's Law Dictionary defines "pretext" as "ostensible reason or motive
assigned or assumed as a color or cover for the real person or motive." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1187 (6th ed. 1990).
49. See BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d at 485.
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and influence the ignorant formal decisionmaker's judgment
to terminate.50
Shager v. Upjohn Co. 1 is the seminal case to proffer the
cat's paw theory. 2 The Seventh Circuit placed limits on the
theory by providing employers a defense. 53  The Seventh
Circuit explained that an employer would not sustain liability
if the termination decision by the formal decisionmaker was
not a mere rubber stamp of the biased subordinate's
suggestions, but rather a decision that the formal
decisionmaker rendered independently.54 Rubber stamping
refers to a situation in which the formal decisionmaker
automatically approves the recommendations of the biased
subordinate.55 Shager recognized the practicalities of the
workplace in that formal decisionmakers are quick to defer to
the subordinate on the spot, whether or not the formal
decisionmaker has knowledge of the subordinate's bias. 6
As a result, a formal decisionmaker who conducts an
independent investigation limits the employer's vicarious
liability.57 If the rule was different, formal decisionmakers
"authorized to rubber stamp personnel actions would preclude
a finding of willfulness no matter how egregious the actions
in question."" An investigation conducted by the formal
decisionmaker negates liability because the employer, acting
through the formal decisionmaker, relied on more than the
subordinate's recommendations or findings. 9
A terminated employee may prove a discrimination claim
against an employer under the McDonnell Douglas pretext
framework. 0 Under the pretext framework, a claimant bears
50. See id. at 486.
51. Shager, v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.3d 398 (7th Cir. 1990).
52. Hill, 354 F.3d at 288.
53. See Shager, 913 F.3d at 406.
54. Id.
55. BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d at 484.
56. See Shager, 913 F.2d at 405.
57. See id. at 406.
58. See id.
59. See id.; see also Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220,
1231-32 (finding that in the course of the formal decisionmaker's investigation,
he asked the terminated employee to give his version of the story, but he
declined to do so).
60. See BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d at 483-84 (arguing that another avenue a
claimant may prove discrimination is under the mixed motive theory, in which
the claimant uses either direct or circumstantial evidence to demonstrate that
his protected class was a motivating factor for the adverse employment action).
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the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination upon the individual's protected class, showing:
1) that he belongs to a protected class; 2) he was qualified for
the benefit or position; 3) he suffered an adverse employment
action; and 4) that the employer treated him less favorably
than others, such as the position remaining open.6'
Thereafter, the employer must articulate and produce
evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action.62  After such a reason is
proffered, the terminated employee must demonstrate that
the employer's reasons were not in fact legitimate, but rather
a pretext for discrimination.63
Utilizing the pretext framework for the cat's paw theory,
the terminated employee must demonstrate that the
subordinate harbored bias animus toward the terminated
employee, and argue that the court impute such bias to the
formal decisionmaker, even though the formal decisionmaker
did not harbor any bias when making the decision to
terminate. 64
C. DISCUSSION OF RELEVANT CIRCUIT COURT CASE LAW
The circuit courts are split as to what level of control a
biased subordinate must exercise over the formal
decisionmaker's choice to terminate.65 The Fourth, Fifth,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits best evidence the varying
boundaries of the split.66
1. Fourth Circuit
In Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Inc.,6 v
fifty-seven year old female Ethel Louise Hill worked as a
61. See id. (citing Exum v. U.S. Olympic Comm'n, 389 F.3d 1130, 1134 (10th
Cir. 2004)).
62. See id. at 484.
63. Id. at 490 (quoting Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir.
1997)) ("To show that an employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason ... is
pretextual, a plaintiff must produce evidence of 'such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable
factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence.").
64. See id.
65. Id. at 486.
66. See infra Part II.C.1-4.
67. Hill, v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt. Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 291 (4th
Cir. 2004).
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mechanic on a field team maintaining aircrafts at various
military bases for Lockheed Martin.6" Hill's supervisors
included Thomas Prickett, program manager of the field
teams, and Archie Griffin, a senior site supervisor. 69 Both
were rarely present at the military bases.70  At the jobsite
itself, Richard Dixon, as lead person, directly supervised the
field teams in order to enforce job duties. 71 Lockheed Martin
also employed a safety inspector, Ed Fultz, at Hill's jobsite in
order to check whether mechanics were in accordance with
safety procedures. 72  However, Fultz "had no supervisory
authority over the mechanics, nor any authority to discipline
them."73 Like the mechanics, the safety inspector reported to
and worked directly under the supervision of the lead
person.74
Lockheed Martin fired Hill after she was charged with
violating company policy that stated that an employee "who
receives a combination of two written reprimands not
involving a suspension and one involving a suspension . ..
will be subject to discharge."7' Hill received her first
reprimand for improperly installing rivets.76 Her second
reprimand, and subsequent three day suspension, arose from
Hill's alleged violation of Lockheed's tool control policy.77
Military employees found a pair of Hill's cutters and turned
them into Fultz, who, in turn, handed them over to Dixon.78
Fultz allegedly told Dixon that he questioned Hill regarding
the whereabouts of her cutters and she stated that she knew
where they were. 79  However, according to Hill, she never
knew that the cutters were missing and denied that she ever
68. See id. at 282.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt. Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 291 (4th
Cir. 2004).
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 292.
77. Id. ("Lockheed's tool control policy requires the aircraft mechanics to
accurately account Tor their tools at all times and to promptly report lost or
missing tools to their immediate supervisor.").
78. See id.
79. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt. In-,., 354 F.3d 277,292 (4th
Cir. 2004).
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had such a conversation with Fultz."°
Hill received her third and final reprimand after Dixon
received six discrepancy reports that Fultz filed against Hill
for faulty work."' Hill claimed that such reports were
"nitpicky and trivial," but nevertheless, Dixon investigated
the reports and determined that all but one were factually
correct.8 2  Therefore, the formal decisionmakers-Prickett
and Griffin-terminated Hill. 3  The formal decisionmakers
relied upon the reports prepared by Fultz that documented
Hill's job performance and safety record. 4
Hill claimed that Lockheed Martin wrongfully discharged
her because of her sex and age, thus violating both Title VII
and the ADEA."5  Hill claimed that Fultz harbored
discriminatory bias against her, calling her such names as
"useless old lady," "troubled old lady," and "damn woman. "86
Hill alleged that such bias tainted Fultz's safety reports
regarding her-the reports that resulted as a basis for her
termination.8 v Hill requested that the court hold Lockheed
Martin vicariously liable because Fultz's discriminatory
comments "substantially influence[ed]" the company's formal
decisionmakers. 8
Recognizing the cat's paw theory, the Fourth Circuit held
that the level of control a biased subordinate must possess
over the formal decisionmaker should equate to such control
"as to be viewed as the one principally responsible for the
decision or the actual decisionmaker for the employer."8 9 The
Fourth Circuit, following Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products,9° declined to impute the bias of the subordinate-
80. See id.
81. See id. at 295-96 (showing that Hill recognized that Fultz's reports were
factually accurate, but because Fultz issued them during the same time he was
uttering discriminatory remarks toward her, she believed a jury could find that
the reprimand was because of her sex and age).
82. Id. at 295.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 296.
85. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt. Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 281 (4th
Cir. 2004).
86. Id. at 283.
87. Id. at 297 (showing that Dixon was critical of Hill's job performance,
testifying that Hill could "do one job today normal. Tomorrow she would mess it
up, and ... you'd tell her that she messed this up and then she'd correct it.").
88. Id. at 289.
89. Id. at 291 (emphasis added).
90. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
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who had no supervisory authority over the terminated
employee-to the formal decisionmaker "simply because [the
subordinate] had a substantial influence on the ultimate
decision or because he [had] played a role, even a significant
one, in the adverse employment decision."91
Thus, in the Fourth Circuit, the biased subordinate has
to be the supervisor or in a managerial-capacity position over
the terminated employee and must be "principally
responsible" for the formal decisionmaker's decision to
terminate the employee.92
Pertaining to the facts at hand, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed Lockheed Martin's summary judgment and held that
Fultz was not Hill's supervisor and consequently it would not
impute Fultz's bias to Prickett and Griffin.93 The Fourth
Circuit explained that Fultz merely commenced the decision
making process through his reports and recommendations
that ultimately led to the termination decision by the formal
decisionmakers.9 6 "The mere fact that Fultz's opinion was
solicited by Griffin during the course of the decisionmaking
process is insufficient to change the undisputed fact that
Griffin reached an independent, non-biased decision to
terminate Hill."95
2. Fifth Circuit
In Russell v. McKinney Hospital Venture,96 fifty-four year
old Sandra Russell worked for Columbia Homecare as the
Director of Clinical Services.9 v Russell worked alongside
twenty-eight year old Steve Ciulla, who was the Director of
Operations.98 Ciulla was the son of the Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) of Homecare's parent company.9 9 Fifty-three
year old Carol Jacobsen was the immediate supervisor of both
Russell and Ciulla.100
Homecare fired Russell and subsequently she brought an
91. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt. Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 291 (4th
Cir. 2004).
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 297.
95. Id.
96. Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 219 (5th Cir. 2000).
97. See id. at 221.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
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age discrimination claim against the company.'0 ' Russell
argued that the court should impute Ciulla's bias to Jacobsen
because Ciulla commonly referred to her as an "old bitch."
10 2
The frequency of name-calling caused Russell to purchase
earplugs so she would be able to drone out his remarks and
get work done at the office. 10 3  Homecare contended that
Ciulla was not the formal decisionmaker in her firing and
that the court should not hold it liable for the intentional
torts of its employees that are outside the scope of
employment. 0 4  Homecare repeatedly emphasized that
"Russell and Ciulla were both managers at the same level
and that Russell was officially terminated by Jacobsen, her
supervisor, not by Ciulla." °5
The Fifth Circuit denied Homecare's motion for judgment
as a matter of law.0 6 The Fifth Circuit explained that the
level of control a biased subordinate must exert for courts to
hold an employer vicariously liable is whether the
subordinate "possessed leverage, or exerted influence, over
the titular decisionmaker." °7 Thus, the biased subordinate
could be a co-worker, supervisor, or a lower level worker.
0 8
The record in the case established that Ciulla was the
son of the CEO and "possessed leverage" that he, in turn,
used to his advantage against Jacobsen so she could officially
terminate Russell. 0 9  Ciulla possessed leverage over
Jacobsen, and the court explained that it would impute such
leverage to Jacobsen even though she did not harbor any
discriminatory bias towards Russell.11°
101. See id.
102. Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 226 (5th Cir. 2000)
(showing that Russell also explained that Ciulla "viciously" referred to her as
"Miss Daisy").
103. See id.
104. See id. at 227.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 230.
107. Id. at 227; see also Haas v. ADVO Sys., Inc., 168 F.3d 732, 734 (5th Cir.
1999) (rejecting defendant's argument that subordinate exerted no influence
over ultimate decisionmaker and thus determining that sufficient evidence
existed to demonstrate a causal nexus between the discriminatory remarks and
the employment decision).
108. See Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 227 (5th Cir.
2000).
109. See id. at 228 (showing Ciulla's father controlled Jacobsen's budget and
he transferred employees under her supervision to different departments
without authority).
110. See id.; see, e.g., Normand v. Research Inst. of Am., 927 F.2d 857, 864
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3. Tenth and Seventh Circuits
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. BCI
Coca-Cola,1 ' Stephen Peters, an African-American, worked
as a merchandiser for BCI. 112 On a day-to-day basis, Jeff
Katt, an account manager of Caucasian origin, supervised
Peters."3  Both Peters and Katt reported directly to Cesar
Grado, a sales manager of Hispanic origin." 4 However,
merchandisers commonly called in sick to Katt."15 Grado had
authority to evaluate employees under his supervision, but
did not have the authority to discipline or fire employees.16
Such formal decisionmaking authority extended to Sherry
Pederson and Pat Edgar, who were both located in the
company's human resources department 450 miles away and
who never before met Peters."'
On one particular Sunday, BCI needed additional
workers and Grado informed Katt to order Peters to work on
that day."18 Peters, who was the most senior merchandiser in
the district and therefore had weekends off, refused to
work."9 According to Grado, Peters replied to Katt that he
would call in sick that day no matter what, but Katt denied
that Peters ever made such a statement. 20 Grado reported
the incident to Pederson because BCI policy prohibited
employees to call in sick in advance.' 2' Pederson told Grado
to inform Peters to come to work on Sunday, and if Peters
failed to do so, BCI would view it as insubordination and thus
grounds for termination. 22  Grado thereafter relayed the
information to Peters, who in turn told Grado that he had
(5th Cir. 1991) (holding that "indirect references to an employee's age . . .can
support an inference of age discrimination.").
111. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d
476 (10th Cir. 2006).
112. Id. at 478 ("More than 60% of the 200 employees at BCI's Albuquerque,
New Mexico facility were Hispanic, while fewer than 2% were African-
Americans.").
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d
476, 479 (10th Cir. 2006).
118. See id.
119. See id. at 478.
120. See id. at 479.
121. See id.
122. See id.
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weekend plans and those plans were none of his business.123
The day before Grado was ordered to come to work,
Peters called in sick to Katt. 24 The doctor had diagnosed him
with a sinus infection and directed him not to return to work
until Monday. 125  Katt had no problem with this and paged
Grado several times with the news; however, Grado never
responded to Katt's pages.126
On the following Monday, Peters returned to work. 127
That same day, Edgar, Pederson, and Grado held a series of
phone conversations regarding Peters' conduct. 128 Edgar
made a final decision regarding termination and based her
decision first and foremost on Peters' insubordination toward
Grado. 129 However, only after they terminated Peters did the
three discover that Katt gave Peters permission to miss work
that Sunday. 130
The EEOC filed suit on behalf of Peters arguing that the
court should impute Grado's racial animus against Peters to
Edgar and Pederson, the formal decisionmakers, even though
they did not know that Peters was African-American nor did
they harbor racial animus toward him. 31 Affidavits revealed
that Grado treated African-American employees worse than
employees of other races. 32 Furthermore, Grado told racial
jokes 133  degrading blacks and was more lenient in
accommodating working schedules for Hispanic employees
than African-American employees.
The Tenth Circuit, aligning itself with the Seventh
Circuit, explained that, in order to prevail on the cat's paw
123. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d
476, 479 (10th Cir. 2006).
124. See id. at 480.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d
476, 480 (10th Cir. 2006).
130. See id. at 482.
131. See id.
132. Id. ("If Grado did not like you, he treated you badly; but African
American employees were treated even worse.").
133. Id. (showing that on one occasion, watching one of his African-American
employees "clean an outdoor vending machine during the winter, Mr. Grado
urged him to hurry because 'brothers don't like the cold.'").
134. Id. at 490 (explaining that when accommodating a Hispanic employee's
schedule who could not work on the weekend, Grado explained, "[You can't
make somebody work [on] one of their days off.").
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theory, "a plaintiff must establish more than mere 'influence,'
or 'input' in the decisionmaking process. 135  The issue is
whether the biased subordinate's discriminatory reports,
recommendations, or other actions caused the adverse
employment action."'36 The biased subordinate need not give
an explicit recommendation to the formal decisionmaker with
regard to terminating the employee but the subordinate's
recommendations must cause the termination. 137
The Tenth Circuit reversed the grant of BCI's summary
judgment and explained that the EEOC produced sufficient
evidence to create a jury question regarding Grado's
discriminatory bias. 3 ' In its defense, BCI contended that the
formal decisionmaker, Pederson, pulled Peters personnel file
and reviewed it, thus independently coming to the conclusion
to fire Peters. 139  The Tenth Circuit held that the
investigation was inadequate to defeat the inference of bias
because the file contained no information regarding Peters'
recent incident. 140
4. Other Circuits
Other circuit courts apply standards that parallel in
some manner the abovementioned circuit courts. 141
The First Circuit's standard states that the discharged
employee need only "show that the discriminatory comments
were made by the key decisionmaker or those in a position to
influence the decisionmaker."' 4 ' The Third Circuit describes
the level of control as such that the subordinate "exhibiting
discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the
decision to terminate."
The Sixth Circuit's standard asserts that "remarks by
135. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d
476, 487 (10th Cir. 2006).
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. See id. at 488.
138. See id. at 493.
139. See id. at 492.
140. Id. at 492-93 ("The problem is that Ms. Edgar never sought any other
version of events, and therefore had no reason other than Mr. Grado's report to
believe that the file was relevant.").
141. See supra Part II.C.1-3.
142. Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 55 (1st
Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
143. Abramson v. William Paterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d. Cir. 2001)
(emphasis added).
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those who did not independently have the authority or did not
directly exercise their authority to fire the plaintiff, but who
nevertheless played a meaningful role in the decision to
terminate the plaintiff, were relevant."1 44 Three years later,
the Sixth Circuit disregarded its own "meaningful role"
standard and explained that a plaintiff must proffer evidence
that the subordinate's animus was the "cause of the
termination or somehow influenced the ultimate
decisionmaker."' 4 '
The Eleventh Circuit suggests that the biased
subordinate must be a "dominant decision-maker whose
decision was rubber-stamped by others" 46 while the District
of Columbia Circuit Court has held that evidence of
subordinate bias is "relevant where the ultimate decision
maker is not insulated from the subordinate's influence." 4 v
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The circuit courts are in agreement that a terminated
employee may utilize the subordinate bias liability-cat's paw
theory-to hold an employer vicariously liable for
employment discrimination.148
However, the circuits are split over the level of control a
biased subordinate must exert over the formal
decisionmaker's decision to fire the employee. 149 The Fourth
Circuit characterizes the level of subordinate control over the
formal decisionmaker by defining the biased subordinate as
one who was a supervisor that was "principally responsible
for the decision or the actual decisionmaker for the
employer."1 5 0  The Fifth Circuit defines the biased
subordinate level of control as a one who "possessed leverage,
or exerted influence, over the titular decisionmaker." 15' The
144. Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 354-55 (6th
Cir. 1998) (emphasis added).
145. Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 877 (6th Cir. 2001)
(emphasis added).
146. Wascura v. City of S. Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1247 (11th Cir. 2001)
(emphasis added).
147. Griffin v. Washington Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
148. See supra note 43.
149. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d
476, 486 (10th Cir. 2006).
150. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt. Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 291 (4th
Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
151. Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 227 (5th Cir. 2000)
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Tenth Circuit aligned itself with the Seventh Circuit and
explained that, in order to prevail on a subordinate bias
liability claim, "a plaintiff must establish more than mere
'influence,' or 'input' in the decisionmaking process.5 2
Rather, the issue is whether the biased subordinate's
discriminatory reports, recommendations, or other actions
caused the adverse employment action."153
The remainder of this comment will discuss and analyze
the different circuit courts' arguments regarding the strength
and weaknesses of their interpretation of the level of control
and the legal principles on which circuits base their
decisions. 5 4  Thereafter, this comment will propose an
interpretation for adoption by the United States Supreme
Court. 55
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Fourth Circuit's Narrow Standard Disregards Agency
Principals
The Fourth Circuit's standard is improperly narrow
because the court only imputes the biases of a supervisor to
the formal decisionmaker, even though some other
subordinate, such as a coworker, may have tainted the
adverse action with bias. 56 The Fourth Circuit adopted the
literal meaning of the statements in Reeves, when it
explained that "petitioner [had] introduced evidence that [the
supervisor] was the actual decisionmaker" and was
"principally responsible" for the firing since he was in a
managerial position."' The Fourth Circuit held that Reeves
marked the "outer contours of who may be considered a
decisionmaker for purposes of imposing liability upon an
employer."158
(emphasis added).
152. BCI Coca-Cola,, 450 F.3d at 487.
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. See infra Part IV.A-C.
155. See infra Part V.
156. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt. Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 301 (4th
Cir. 2004) (Michael, J., dissenting) ("The majority renders Title VII and the
ADEA essentially toothless when it comes to protecting employees against
unlawful employment decisions that are motivated by biased subordinates.").
157. Id. at 291.
158. Id. at 289.
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The Fourth Circuit incorrectly overemphasizes the
phrase "actual decisionmaker" that the court provided in
Reeves.1 59 However, in Reeves, "the Court was describing
what the petitioner's evidence showed, not prescribing the
'outer counters' of liability."160 Thus, the Fourth Circuit
incorrectly defined Reeves as the outer limits of the bias
subordinate liability theory instead of interpreting its
standard as but one example of level of control. 16' Judge
Posner, the originator of the cat's paw theory, criticized the
Hill court for applying an excessively literal meaning.' 61
Judge Posner stated, "The [cat's paw] formula was (obviously)
not intended to be taken literally.., and were it taken even
semiliterally it would be inconsistent with the normal
analysis of causal issues in tort litigation. "163
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit's emphasis on the
supervisor or "actual decisionmaker" goes against the
statutory construct of employment antidiscrimination
legislation, as well as agency law principles.'6 The word
"decisionmaker" does not appear in Title VII, the ADEA, or
the ADA. 165 Rather, the pieces of legislation impose liability
to employers and their agents, "which in accordance with
agency law principles includes not only 'decisionmakers' but
other agents whose actions, aided by the agency relation,
cause injury.' 66 Title VII and the ADEA both provide that it
is unlawful "for an employer.., to discharge ... because of
such individual's protected trait, such as age or race."167
Thus, the statutes focus employer liability upon causation-
arising from the "because of' language in the statutes-and
therefore it need not matter whether the subordinate was a
supervisor who was principally responsible for the
termination so long as the biased subordinate caused the
159. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d
476, 487 (10th Cir. 2006).
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. See Lust v. Sealy, Inc. 383 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2004).
163. Id.
164. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt. Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 302-04
(4th Cir. 2004) (Michael, J., dissenting).
165. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d
476, 487 (10th Cir. 2006).
166. Id.
167. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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termination through the formal decisionmaker. 168
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit's narrow standard
contradicts public policy considerations and Congress's intent
when it passed employment antidiscrimination legislation. 169
The Fourth Circuit's standard of defining the level of control
over a biased supervisor who is "principally responsible" for
the termination is unduly narrow, allowing certain victimized
employees to go without redress. 170
By focusing on the principally responsible supervisor, the
Fourth Circuit's interpretation would remove an entire group
of discrimination cases-discrimination cases that involve
biased subordinates other than supervisors who still have the
ability to convey their discriminatory animus to the formal
decisionmaker. 171 Such a narrow standard allows employers
to escape liability even when the subordinate's discrimination
is the central cause of the firing because the subordinate did
not exhibit complete control over the decisionmaker. 17' As
Fourth Circuit Judge Michael stated in the Hill dissent,
"After today in this circuit, an employer is off the hook for a
discriminatory employment decision that is motivated by the
bias of a subordinate who lacks decisionmaking authority.
That is wrong.,' 73
In a practical sense, the Fourth Circuit's standard would
create a significant barrier for terminated employees, such as
Hill, to have their cases heard by a jury. 74 In Hill, there was
strong evidence suggesting that Fultz conveyed his bias to the
formal decisionmakers, Prickett and Griffin. 75 However,
since Fultz was not Hill's supervisor but rather a coworker,
the Fourth Circuit declined to impute this to the employer. 76
168. See Hill, 354 F.3d at 302.
169. See id. at 301.
170. See id. at 302.
171, See id. at 304.
172. See id.
173. Id. at 299.
174. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt. Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 304 (4th
Cir. 2004) (Michael, J., dissenting).
175. See id. at 296-97.
176. See id. at 297.
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B. Fifth Circuit's Lenient Approach Provides a
Barrier to the Employer's Defense of Conducting
an Independent Investigation
The Fifth Circuit's approach extends liability to
employers too broadly. 7  The Fifth Circuit's standard
considers that any influence, reporting of factual information,
or other means by a subordinate makes the employer
vicariously liable provided that such information and
influence affected the choice to fire. 8 A liberal standard
"that punishes employers for any 'input'-no matter how
minor-weakens the deterrent effect of subordinate bias
claims by imposing liability even where an employer has
diligently conducted an independent investigation."179
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit's approach weakens the
employer's defense of escaping liability by conducting an
independent investigation. 180 Any input by the biased
subordinate would taint the investigation itself thereby
rendering the employer liable.'
In a practical sense, such a lenient standard increases
litigation.8 2 A fired and aggrieved employee may "find
someone whose input into the process was in some way
motivated by an impermissible factor" and attempt to argue
that such bias should be attributed to the final
decisionmaker.' 8 3  The terminated employee may unjustly
take advantage of the cat's paw theory and attempt to hold
someone liable for his termination, a termination that was
not based on any protected trait.'8' Furthermore, there is a
possibility that an employee may be able to immunize himself
from any "future disciplinary action for misconduct or poor
work performance simply by alleging that [he] was subject to
unlawful harassment by a coworker."18 5
177. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d
476, 486 (10th Cir. 2004).
178. See id. at 487.
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See Brief for Equal Employment Advisory Council and Chamber of
Commerce of the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-
Appellee, Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt. Inc., No. 01-1359, at 19 (4th
Cir. May 1, 2003).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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Moreover, formal decisionmakers and employers rely on
subordinates who have first-hand knowledge of the
terminated employee's work. 1 6  It would essentially bar
formal decisionmakers from soliciting input "from a
subordinate who has been accused of bias [because it] would
allow an employee to forestall any disciplinary action for
misconduct or poor performance based on a subordinate's
report simply by accusing the subordinate of
discrimination."1 7 An employee may be able to hold the
employer liable for a biased subordinate's actions even though
the employer has the legitimate right to fire the employee for
such causes as weak performance or a lack of productivity.
C. The Seventh and Tenth Circuits Correspond with
the Statutory Construct and Agency Principles of
Employment Antidiscrimination Legislation
The Tenth Circuit aligned itself with the Seventh Circuit
and stated that an employer will be held liable if a biased
subordinate's discriminatory animus, through actions such as
reports or recommendations, caused the termination.' Thus,
the Tenth Circuit rejected the Fourth Circuit's approach
because the Tenth Circuit's approach focuses on the causal
relationship between the biased subordinate and the formal
decisionmaker rather than the title or rank of the biased
subordinate.'89 The Tenth Circuit more clearly conforms to
the language of antidiscrimination employment legislation,
which provides that it is unlawful for an employer to
discharge an individual because of that individual's protected
trait.9 ° The "because of" language creates a causal nexus and
does not discern what title or authority the biased
subordinate holds over the terminated employee. 19'
In addition, the level of biased subordinate control
complies with agency principles that the Court dictated in
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d
476, 487 (10th Cir. 2004).
189. See id. at 487-88.
190. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); 28 U.S.C. § 630(b).
191. See BCI Coca-Cola,, 450 F.3d at 488; see also Rea v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 29 F.3d 1450, 1457 (10th Cir. 1994) (requiring a "causal nexus" between
the discriminatory workplace statements and the termination decision).
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Ellerth.'92 Agency principles apply because the biased
subordinate accomplishes his discriminatory goals by
"misusing the authority granted to him by the employer; for
example, the authority to monitor performance, report
disciplinary infractions, and recommend actions."193 Under
the Tenth Circuit's view, the biased subordinate does not
have to be the supervisor of the terminated employee, but can
be a coworker; the terminated employee need only
demonstrate a causal connection. 194  A business's
organizational chart does not always echo the employer's
decisionmaking process.'95 A biased coworker may have as
much authority over the formal decisionmaker as does the
terminated employee's supervisor.
19 6
Furthermore, the need for the biased subordinate to
explicitly recommend the firing of the employee would
contradict the broad agency principles in Title VII, the ADEA,
and the ADA. 197  Such an explicit recommendation would
leave terminated employees without any recourse as long as a
subordinate "stops short of mouthing the words 'you should
fire him,' in person or on paper to the decisionmaker." 98 In
BCI Coca-Cola, Grado did not explicitly demand that
Pederson and Edgar terminate Peters, yet the court
suggested that his bias tainted the conversations with the
formal decisionmakers.199 "Subordinate bias claims simply
recognize that many companies separate the decisionmaking
function from the investigation and reporting functions, and
that racial bias can taint any of those functions."200
V. PROPOSAL
The Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split
concerning the level of control a biased subordinate should
192. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 755-65 (1998).
193. BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d at 485.
194. See id. at 486 ("This standard comports with the agency law principles
that animate the statutory definition of an 'employer.'").
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 488.
198. Id.
199. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d
476, 490 (10th Cir. 2004) (showing the Court believed that the racial incidents
taken as a whole would support a charge of discrimination against African-
American employees).
200. Id. at 488.
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exert over the formal decisionmaker's choice to terminate an
employee. This comment proposes an interpretation that
would solve the problems identified above. In addition, it
proposes what courts should consider a sufficient independent
investigation in order for courts not to hold an employer
vicariously liable. These proposed interpretations maintain a
sufficient balance between the policy goals and concerns of
terminated employees who seek remedies and employers who
seek not to be held liable for the torts of their subordinates
conducted outside the scope of their employment.2 °'
The Fifth Circuit's lax approach as to the level of biased
subordinate control does not sufficiently ground itself in the
statutory construct of the antidiscrimination statutes, which
require a causal connection between the subordinate's bias
toward the terminated employee and the formal
decisionmaker's decision to terminate the employee based on
such bias.20 2 A terminated employee would be able to survive
summary judgment by showing that a biased subordinate
provided factual information or other input, however minimal
it may be, that in turn affected the formal decisionmaker's
decision to terminate.20 3 Thus, a terminated employee may be
able to hold the employer vicariously liable for a subordinate's
sexist or racial remark in the workplace even though the
employer condemns such behavior and likely has policies and
procedures set in place that attempt to mitigate such remarks
in the workplace.2°  Such tenuous influences would only
further litigation and make formal decisionmakers weary of
any recommendations from subordinates concerning a
possible firing in fear of the formal decisionmaker's concerns
that the employer will be held liable.20 5
The Fourth Circuit's narrow, strict approach, which
demands that the biased subordinate be in a managerial
capacity, works against Congress's intent when it directed
federal courts to interpret antidiscrimination legislation
based on agency principles. 20 6 The Fourth Circuit's standard
only allows for agents that are supervisors and neglects the
201. See Lees, supra note 7, at 881-82.
202. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
203. See BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d at 486 (citing Dey v. Dolt Constr. & Dev.
Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir. 1994)).
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
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biases of agents who are in a non-managerial role that may
nonetheless convey their bias to the formal decisionmaker. °7
Such a standard allows employers to escape liability because
courts would decline to impute the biases of coworkers and
other people in non-managerial positions to the employer,
thus leaving many terminated employees without a judicial
remedy.2 °8
The Supreme Court should adopt the interpretation
promulgated by the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit's
standard of causation comports with agency principles and
balances the concerns of terminated employees and
employers. 20 9 Agency principles conclude that courts may
hold an employer liable for its agent's torts.210 Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court and lower courts, utilizing the Tenth
Circuit standard, should recognize and stress the practical
differences in authority a subordinate may have over the
terminated employee. Courts should place emphasis on and
account for the differences between a subordinate who is a
biased supervisor and a subordinate who is a biased coworker
of the terminated employee. Unlike a supervisor, a biased
coworker likely has no authority over the employee and his
work product, such as the ability to write evaluations,
recommendations, allocate tasks, create work groups, and
assign work schedules. Since a coworker has less authority
over the terminated employee, courts should consider this
reality of the workplace, along with causation and agency
principles.
With regard to the employer's defense of conducting an
independent investigation, at minimum, an independent
investigation should include an interview conducted by the
formal decisionmaker of the employee before the
decisionmaker has determined whether to terminate. Such a
nominal requirement would not heavily constrain an
employer's resources, and provide a venue at the workplace
for the victim of employment discrimination to be heard by
his employer. Speaking with the formal decisionmaker would
allow the employee to bring attention to any possible bias by
207. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
212. See supra Part II.B.
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subordinates that the employee believes has tainted the
employee's work, such as evaluations and assignments.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the cat's paw theory, a terminated employee can
hold his employer vicariously liable for the actions of a biased
subordinate if the court imputes the biased subordinate's
animus to the formal decisionmaker.212 Even though the
formal decisionmaker, whether a manager in the human
resources department or an employment committee, did not
harbor any discriminatory bias toward the terminated
employee, the employee may still be held accountable through
agency principles.213
However, as it currently stands, the different circuit
court standards regarding the level of control that a biased
subordinate must exert over the formal decisionmaker are not
uniform. 214 The United States Supreme Court should adopt
the causation standard of the Tenth Circuit and account for
the practicalities of the workplace, namely whether the
biased subordinate was the supervisor of the terminated
employee or whether the biased subordinate was a
coworker.215  Adopting this standard will balance the
competing policy concerns regarding a terminated employee's
right to remedies and an employer's right to minimize his
liability for the torts of his subordinates that are outside the
scope of employment.1 6
213. See supra Part II.B.
214. See supra Part III.
215. See supra Part V.
216. See supra Part V.
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